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Privileged Communications in the Corporate Counsel Setting
Bridget Marks*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Gucci America, Inc. ("Gucci") filed a trademark infringe-
ment suit against Guess?, Inc. ("Guess") in 2009, both the fashion and
legal worlds quickly seized upon the case. In the fashion realm, many
were shocked by the seemingly blatant attempts by Guess to utilize
Gucci's long-standing emblems.' In the legal realm, many were
shocked to find out in the initial phases of the suit that Gucci's lead in-
house counsel attorney, Jonathan Moss ("Moss"), did not have an ac-
tive bar membership anywhere in the country.2 Perhaps even more
shocking was Gucci's complete ignorance of this fact. 3 Moss' lack of
an active bar membership became a central contentious point when
Guess demanded that Gucci turn over numerous communications
during the discovery phase. 4 Additionally, the case posed interesting
issues of how to treat communications to and from international affili-
ate legal departments, specifically when the person making the com-
munications was a legal assistant and not an attorney.5 These issues
were presented to Judge Scheindlin of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, who referred the matter
to a magistrate judge, Judge Cott.6 In Gucci I, Judge Cott ruled that
some of the international communications were protected under the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, while other
communications by the same assistant were not protected.7 Judge
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Carleton College.
1. Hayley Phelan, This Gucci v. Guess Court Battle Just Keeps Getting Better, FASHIONISTA
(Apr. 10, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://fashionista.com/2012/04/the-gucci-v-guess-court-battle-just-
keeps-getting-better. Phelan notes that Gucci presented evidence in court of Guess sending
Gucci fabric samples to Guess' fabric supplier with intent to copy the coloring and patterns. Id.
2. Stephanie Rabiner, Gucci v. Guess Trademark Suit Can Go Forward, Judge Rules, FI-




5. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
6. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011).
7. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 81.
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Cott also ruled that Moss could not be protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege.8 In Gucci II, Judge Scheindlin ultimately upheld Judge
Cott's rulings on the international communications but overturned his
ruling concerning the application of the attorney-client privilege to
Moss. 9
This Comment focuses on the ultimate outcome in Gucci v. Guess?,
specifically the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine to in-house counsel attorneys. Part II of this
Comment explains background information and the current state of
the common law on each of these doctrines. These broad doctrines
have many facets; for the purpose of brevity, this Comment focuses on
the basics of these doctrines and the special issues that arise under
them in relation to corporate counsel settings.
Following a brief review of background information, this Comment
discusses the pertinent facts surrounding the Gucci litigation, includ-
ing the litigation's advancement through the courts. This section also
includes background information on two of the key players in this dis-
cussion: Moss and Vanni Volpi ("Volpi"). This Comment then delves
into a dissection of the ultimate rulings on the five different issues
raised pertaining to the allegedly privileged documents. While several
of the rulings uphold the underlying purpose behind the privilege doc-
trines, other rulings undermine these doctrines.
Following the analysis of the holdings in Gucci I and Gucci II, this
Comment discusses how the decisions reached will affect corporate




Recognized as one of the oldest privileges for confidential commu-
nications, the attorney-client privilege is well established in the United
States.10 The Supreme Court has relied on the attorney-client privi-
lege in cases as early as 1888, stating that the privilege "is founded
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the
aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."" Modern
8. Id.
9. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *1-2.
10. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
11. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
courts state that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to en-
courage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and administration of justice." 12 The doctrine arose from
two basic tenets in the legal profession: sound legal advice and advo-
cacy go towards the public ends, and thorough legal advice depends
upon how much information a client conveys to his attorney.13 An
attorney cannot effectively advocate for his client unless the attorney
knows "all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representa-
tion."14 Therefore, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
"encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys."' 5
In order to invoke the attorney-client privilege, a party must show
"(1) a communication between client and counsel that (2) was in-
tended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) was made for
the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice."1 6 Furthermore,
the privilege rests solely with the client, not the attorney.' 7 Therefore,
on the one hand, the client must actively claim the privilege, and, on
the other hand, the client must not waive the privilege.18 The burden
of proof for each of these elements rests on the party claiming the
benefit of the privilege. 19
Although the attorney-client privilege holds a prominent place in
the law, the doctrine is construed narrowly because it effectively ren-
ders relevant information undiscoverable. 20 The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the privilege applies only to communications and
not to the underlying facts.21 For example, a client on the witness
stand cannot be compelled to answer, "What did you say or write to
your attorney?" However, the same witness cannot claim a privilege
when asked about any relevant fact within his knowledge simply be-
cause he included that fact in a communication to his attorney. 22
Several issues arise with the application of the attorney-client privi-
lege, particularly in business law situations in which the client is a cor-
poration. 23 Although the idea of a corporation as an individual is a
12. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
13. Id.
14. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
15. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
16. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007).
17. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
18. Id.
19. United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 418.
21. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
22. Id. at 396.
23. Id. at 389.
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legal fiction, courts rely on this theory when applying the attorney-
client privilege.24 The Supreme Court has long assumed that the at-
torney-client privilege applies when the client is a corporation.25
However, the federal appellate courts have attempted to restrict the
application of the attorney-client privilege by applying the privilege
only in situations in which certain people who personify the corpora-
tion relay information to an attorney.26 The Supreme Court has
shifted the focus of this inquiry to whether the information relayed to
the attorney assists the attorney in providing sound legal advice: "The
privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to
those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the law-
yer to enable him to give sound and informed advice."27 This ap-
proach, sometimes referred to as the "subject matter" test, applies the
attorney-client privilege to an employee's communication if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the re-
quest so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not dis-
seminated beyond those persons who, because of corporate struc-
ture, need to know its contents. 28
In order to gather all relevant legal information, an attorney may
need to speak with employees who are closer to the ground floor and
hold specific knowledge.29 While the federal appellate courts would
have previously held these communications unprivileged and subject
to discovery in litigation, the Supreme Court has ruled that such com-
munications are protected by the attorney-client privilege and, there-
fore, shielded from discovery.30
Another issue with the application of the attorney-client privilege to
business law arises in the context of a corporation's in-house counsel.
In-house counsel can serve as either a client (when communicating
with outside counsel) or as an attorney-legal advisor (when communi-
cating with corporate personnel).31 Although communications be-
24. Id. at 389-90.
25. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
26. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
27. Id.
28. Maryanne Lyons & Dennis P. Duffy, Employment and Labor Relations Law for the Cor-
porate Counsel and the General Practitioner, SN020 ALI-ABA 689, 41 (2008).
29. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391.
30. Id. at 397.
31. United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073-74 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1485, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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tween non-legal corporate personnel and in-house counsel are
afforded the same privileged protections as communications with
outside counsel, all of the elements of the attorney-client privilege
must nonetheless be met for the privilege to apply. 32 Specifically, the
third element-that the communication must be "made for the pur-
pose of obtaining or providing legal advice"-becomes contentious
when applying the privilege to in-house counsel communications.33 In
order to meet this element, a party must be careful to note that the
communications were made for "legal" advice rather than "business"
advice, the latter of which is not covered by the privilege.34 As such,
typical, everyday types of communications between corporate person-
nel and in-house counsel cannot be shielded from discovery under the
attorney-client privilege.35
When a communication is made to someone performing duties at
the behest of counsel, rather than directly to an attorney, further at-
torney-client privilege issues arise. In United States v. Kovel, the Sec-
ond Circuit extended the privilege to protect communications from a
client to an accountant who was assisting the attorney in representing
the client.36 The privilege has since been extended to include individ-
uals who assist attorneys in providing legal services, including "secre-
taries and law clerks"37 as well as "investigators, interviewers,
technical experts, accountants, physicians, patent agents, and other
specialists in a variety of social and physical sciences."38 This exten-
sion of the attorney-client privilege's application arose from the recog-
nition that third parties often serve to clarify information and
facilitate communication between an attorney and his client.39 How-
ever, the communication at issue must still meet all of the elements of
attorney-client privilege, meaning that the advice ultimately sought
must still be the attorney's legal opinion.40
The geographic expansion of corporations beyond national borders
has created another common issue when determining the applicability




36. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir. 1961).
37. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
38. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300, 311 (D.N.J. 2008).
39. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
40. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999).
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of the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel communications. 41
While attorneys may be familiar with legal precedence in the United
States, foreign jurisdictions vary greatly on the application of the at-
torney-client privilege to in-house counsel communications.42 This
becomes a concern as attorneys within a multinational corporation
often need to communicate with personnel around the world on nu-
merous legal issues.43 These attorneys need to be aware of which
country's law applies because many countries do not provide the same
level of attorney-client protection as the level afforded in the United
States.44 While certain "countries extend the privilege to corporate
attorneys, some jurisdictions withhold the privilege, and still other na-
tions qualify the privilege for in-house counsel." 45
B. Work Product Doctrine
The basic tenet of the work product doctrine is to protect an attor-
ney's personal work made for litigation from discovery.46 The doc-
trine is codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
26(b)(3)(A): "Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." 47
The rules go on to state that an exception exists when a party has a
"substantial need" for the items sought in order to prepare properly
for its case and cannot, "without undue hardship," get the information
via some other way. 4 8 A substantial need exists "where the informa-
tion sought is 'essential' to the party's defense, is 'crucial' to the deter-
mination of whether the defendant could be held liable for the acts
alleged, or carries great probative value on contested issues." 49
The purpose of the work product doctrine is to "preserve a zone of
privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and
strategies 'with an eye toward litigation,' free from unnecessary intru-
41. Joseph Pratt, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel at the




44. Id. at 147.
45. Id.
46. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
48. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).
49. Nat'l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. New York, 194 F.R.D. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting Cornelius v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 250, 254 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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sion by his adversaries."5 0 A heightened degree of protection is af-
forded to an attorney's personal opinion work product, which includes
items such as "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, [and] mental impressions."51 On the other hand, while factual
material in an attorney's work product is also protected under the
work product doctrine, it is not afforded the heightened protection of
opinion work products.52
The work product doctrine restricts discovery of "(1) a document or
tangible thing, (2) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation, and
(3) was prepared by or for a party, or by or for his representative." 5 3
The burden of proof for meeting these elements lies with the party
asserting the privilege.54 Parties often focus on the second element-
that the privileged document was prepared in "anticipation of litiga-
tion."5 5 In order to meet the burden of proof, a party must show that
"in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared
or obtained because of the prospect of litigation."5 6 A document pre-
pared merely because of the possibility of litigation is insufficient for
meeting the required standard.57 This especially becomes an issue in
business settings, specifically for in-house counsel, because documents
ordinarily prepared in the course of business and documents that
would have been prepared even absent the prospect of litigation are
not protected by the work product doctrine.58
As opposed to the attorney-client privilege, the work product doc-
trine does not require that documents be prepared by an attorney in
order to be afforded protection.59 Rather, the work product doctrine
only requires that the documents be prepared "in anticipation of liti-
gation." 60 As such, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v.
Nobles that "attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investiga-
tors and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation
for trial," meaning that the work product doctrine "protect[s] mate-
rial[s] prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by
50. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
51. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
52. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1197.
53. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 73-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
54. Id. at 74.
55. Id.
56. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis in original).
57. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 74.
58. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202.
59. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 74.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
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the attorney himself." 61 The Supreme Court's extension of the work
product doctrine in Nobles is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the doctrine: "'prevent[ing] exploitation of a party's efforts in pre-
paring for trial' by precluding the adversary from obtaining such ma-
terial absent substantial need." 62 This extension of the doctrine has
been applied to protect the work of those "enlisted by legal counsel to
perform investigative or analytical tasks to aid counsel in
prepara[tion] for litigation," such as a private investigator hired by
counsel to prepare a report.63
III. SUBJECT OPINION: Gucci v. GUESS
In 2009, the well-established, high-end fashion and leather goods
affiliate of the Italian designer, Gucci America, Inc. ("Gucci"), filed a
trademark infringement suit in the Southern District of New York
against Guess?, Inc. ("Guess"), a lower-end American clothing brand
line. 64 Gucci alleged that Guess sold items with "studied imitations of
the Gucci trademarks," and, in some interesting word play in the com-
plaint, that Guess attempted to "Gucci-fy" its product line by infring-
ing on several of Gucci's patents. 65 Specifically, Gucci alleged that
Guess infringed on five of its trademarked designs: (1) a "repeating
Guess Quattro G pattern;" (2) an "interlocking G" design; (3) a
green-red-green stripe pattern for handbags and luggage; (4) the "in-
terlocking G" design in addition to a diamond; and (5) a "stylized
G."66 Ultimately, the court found in mid-2012 that Guess had in-
fringed on several of Gucci's patents and awarded Gucci $4.6 million
in damages. 67 While the case gained notoriety within the fashion
world for its ultimate finding of trademark infringement, the case also
gained notoriety in the legal world, albeit for a different reason.
During the initial discovery, Gucci submitted a privilege log that
listed relevant legal documents that Gucci claimed were privileged
61. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975).
62. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 74 (quoting Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz.,
881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1988)).
63. Costabile v. Cnty. of Westchester, 254 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
64. Staci Zaretsky, Fashion Law & Order: The Latest in the Gucci v. Guess Debacle, ABOVE
THE LAw (May 22, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/05/fashion-law-order-the-latest-
in-the-gucci-v-guess-debacle: Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 61.
65. Zaretsky, supra note 64.
66. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 66. See also Tamara Winegust, Guess? Who: Gucci "wins" injunction,
$4.6 million in trademark suit against Guess?, AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF (June 14, 2012, 6:42
AM), http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/06/14/guess-who-gucci-wins-injunction-4-6-million-in-trade-
mark-suit-against-guess.
67. Zaretsky, supra note 64.
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and, therefore, not subject to discovery.68 The privilege log contained
communications to and from both Moss, Gucci's in-house counsel
based in the United States, and Volpi, a legal assistant based in Italy
for Gucci's Italian affiliate, Guccio Gucci ("GG").69 Despite Gucci's
claims that the communications were protected from discovery under
both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine,
Guess demanded production of the communications.70 Gucci sought
a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to prevent disclosure of the Moss and Volpi communications. 71
While claiming privileges in order to protect legal communications
is a norm in modern corporate litigation, this case presented several
unique elements. First, Gucci and Guess disagreed on the applicabil-
ity of American privileges to legal documents for Volpi's communica-
tions. Second, Judge Cott addressed whether the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine could be applied to Volpi as
he was not a licensed attorney. Third, and perhaps the largest legal
issue, Gucci quickly discovered during the initial litigation that Moss
did not have an active bar membership, leading Guess to argue that
the attorney-client privilege did not apply to Moss' communications.
These issues were initially presented to Judge Scheindlin, a federal
district court judge for the Southern District of New York.72 Judge
Scheindlin referred these procedural issues to Judge Cott, a magistrate
judge, who made a ruling on all of the issues. 73 Judge Scheindlin re-
viewed Judge Cott's rulings, upholding in part and overturning in
part.74 This Comment will refer to Judge Cott's opinion as Gucci I
and Judge Scheindlin's opinion as Gucci II.
A. Vanni Volpi
Volpi was hired in 2006 as "Intellectual Property Counsel" for GG,
Gucci's Italian affiliate.75 Despite this title, Volpi did not have a juris
doctorate and was never a licensed attorney. 76 However, he studied
law for a combined total of five years at both the University of Pisa
68. Gucci, 271 F.R.D at 66.
69. Id. at 61.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011).
73. Id.; Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 81.
74. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *2.
75. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 62.
76. Id.
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and the University of Paris.77 Prior to working for GG, Volpi worked
as an intellectual property specialist in both the Chanel and Louis
Vuitton legal departments.78 As such, Volpi "consider[ed] himself to
be a trained legal professional in the field of intellectual property" as
he worked for approximately ten years as an intellectual property spe-
cialist in those legal departments.79 Volpi also "received the In-House
Counsel of the Year award by World Trade Review, an international,
intellectual property trade publication."8 0
One of Volpi's duties at GG was to assist in "managing GG's trade-
mark protection and enforcement efforts in every country in which
GG owned trademarks," which involved over seventy countries.8' In
order to complete this task effectively, Volpi had to communicate with
other legal professionals and personnel who worked for GG affiliates,
"customs and border patrol agencies, law enforcement, and outside
counsel in an effort to coordinate global enforcement of GG's trade-
mark portfolio." 82
Daniella Delia Rosa ("Delia Rosa") supervised Volpi and the rest
of the twenty-member in-house counsel team at GG.8 3 Delia Rosa
was the only person in the legal department at GG who was a bar-
admitted attorney, having been admitted to the bar in New York, It-
aly, and Belgium.84 Despite the fact that staff members were not li-
censed attorneys, GG relied heavily on them to "provide substantive
advice regarding intellectual property matters."85 For example, Volpi
often provided advice on intellectual property issues. 86 However, dur-
ing litigation, Gucci stated that Volpi did not make "important legal
decisions" or provide "legal advice without first consulting Delia
Rosa."87 In addition to his daily communications with Delia Rosa,
Volpi also "perform[ed] certain functions autonomously".88
Volpi began an investigation in March 2008, under Delia Rosa's in-
structions, into Guess' alleged infringement of GG trademarks in It-
77. Id. at 63.
78. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Gucci America v. Guess?, Inc.: Cross-Border
Privilege Dispute Resolved Applying "Touch Base" Test, JD SUPRA LEGAL NEws (May 10,
2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/gucci-america-v-guess-inc-cross-bor-29664/.
79. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 62 (internal quotation omitted).
80. Id. at 62-63.
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id.
83. Id.






aly.8 9 In the course of his investigation, Volpi communicated with
various outside advisors, both in the United States and Italy, as well as
with other personnel at international Gucci affiliates.90 Volpi con-
veyed the results of the investigation to Delia Rosa, who decided to
coordinate with GG affiliates worldwide to commence a trademark
infringement action against Guess in Italy.91 In November 2008, Volpi
traveled to New York to discuss the results of his investigation with
Gucci's in-house and outside counsel, as well as with other Gucci per-
sonnel, as Gucci was considering filing a parallel action in the United
States.92 Before filing suit, Gucci decided to conduct a deeper investi-
gation into Guess's alleged infringement.93 Volpi continued his inves-
tigation and, between November 2008 and April 2009, Volpi further
communicated with outside advisors in both the United States and
Italy, as well as with personnel at Gucci affiliates worldwide. 94 Volpi
also took on a supervisory role over other staff in GG's in-house
counsel team who assisted in the investigation.95
B. Jonathan Moss
Moss graduated from Fordham Law School in 1993 and passed the
California Bar Examination later that same year. 96 On September 1,
1996, Moss decided to set his California Bar status to inactive. 97 MOSS
remained an inactive member of the California bar and continued to
pay a required annual fee to maintain his inactive status.98
Gucci hired Moss in 2002 as a legal associate. 99 At that time, Gucci
was aware that Moss had a law degree, but no one at Gucci ever "in-
vestigated Moss' status as a practicing attorney or his qualifications to
practice law."100 Although Gucci later asserted during trial that the
corporation did not initially hire Moss to perform legal services,
within months of being hired, Moss filed a pro hac vice motion in U.S.
89. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 63.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 63-64.
93. Id. at 64.
94. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 64.
95. Id.
96. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Mark Hamblett, Court Finds Gucci Communication With Unlicensed Lawyer Privileged,
245 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2011).
100. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *8-9.
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Bankruptcy Court.101 Moss was promoted in 2003 to Legal Counsel,
again in 2005 to Director of Legal Services, and again in 2008 to Vice
President, Director of Legal and Real Estate. 102 During his time at
Gucci, Moss had provided numerous and various legal services includ-
ing "appearing before courts and administrative agencies, filing trade-
mark applications, handling employment matters, and negotiating
leases." 103 On the trademark applications, Moss was listed as an "at-
torney-at-law and member of the Bar of California." 1 0 4
With the initiation of the lawsuit against Guess, it quickly came to
light that Moss was not an active member of any bar.10 5 Moss was
subsequently fired by Gucci in 2010.106
IV. ANALYSIS
In breaking down the many unique aspects in the application of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine in this case, Judge
Cott in Gucci I ultimately gave rulings on what he determined were
five different issues; in Gucci II, Judge Scheindlin later upheld the rul-
ings on four of the issues and overturned the ruling on the fifth issue.
Gucci I addressed the numerous communications by dividing them
into three distinct sections: (1) Volpi's pre-October 2008 communica-
tions; (2) Volpi's post-October 2008 communications; and (3) Moss'
communications. 0 7 This Comment will address each of the five issues
that touch on these different sections of communications.
A. The Volpi Communications "Touch Base" With the United
States, Such That American Law Governs the
Attorney-Client Privilege
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, questions of priv-
ilege are "governed by the principles of the common law."108 Com-
mon law involves choice-of-law questions.109 Because Volpi was
based in Italy and communicated with legal professionals around the
world, the court had to address the issue of which law to apply in
deciding whether to grant protection to his communications.1 0 Both
101. Hamblett, supra note 99.
102. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *8.
103. Id. at *8-9.
104. Hamblett, supra note 99.
105. Rabiner, supra note 2.
106. Id.
107. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
108. FED. R. EvID. 501 advisory committee's notes.
109. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 64.
110. Id.
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Gucci and Guess agreed that Volpi's communications involved foreign
law; however, they disagreed on which country's law should apply.111
Gucci advocated for the application of American law, which affords
in-house counsel communications the same attorney-client privilege as
communications with outside counsel. 112 Guess argued that Italian
law should apply because (1) Volpi was located in Italy, (2) his emails
were on Italian servers, and (3) the communications related to the
litigation in Italy.113 Italian law uses a different standard for in-house
counsel attorney-client privileges, which results in less protection for
such communications. 114
The court in Gucci I applied the "touch base" approach, which as-
sists courts in determining which country's law applies when deciding
privilege claims involving foreign documents.11 The touch base ap-
proach focuses on the country with the "dominant interest in deter-
mining whether the communications in question should be treated as
confidential," reasoning that that country was "the place where the
allegedly privileged relationship was entered into."116 The laws of the
country with the predominant interest are then applied as the choice
of law. 117 Courts have interpreted this predominant interest standard
to mean that when communications concern legal actions in the
United States, American law will apply, but when communications
concern legal actions in another country, the other country's laws will
apply.1"s "[Clommunications relating to legal proceedings in the
United States, or that reflect the provision of advice regarding Ameri-
can law, 'touch base' with the United States and, therefore, are gov-
erned by American law, even though the communication may involve




114. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 64. American law allows for broader protection of in-house counsel
attorney-client privilege while Italian law is much narrower in its scope, affording hardly any
such protection for in-house counsel.
115. Id.
116. Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
117. Id. at 522.
118. See Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 521; Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 208
F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 98 Civ. 0835, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22998, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2005); Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp., No. 01
Civ. 8115, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13560, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2002); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 02 Civ. 7618, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16514, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
11, 2005); Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1992);
Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., Civ. A. 00-981, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23886, at *9 (D. Del. Nov. 18, 2002).
119. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 65.
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Gucci argued that Volpi's communications touched base with
American law because Volpi was involved in a global litigation strat-
egy, which resulted in the filing of lawsuits in both Italy and the
United States.120 Guess argued that Volpi's communications touched
base with Italian law because his emails were maintained on a server
in Italy, and the communications related to the litigation in Italy. 121
Judge Cott in Gucci I sided with Gucci and held that both the pre-
October 2008 and the post-October 2008 communications by Volpi
touched base with the United States, and, therefore, American law
applied. 122 Judge Cott reasoned that both sets of communications in-
volved contact with American counsel about possible trademark in-
fringement actions to be filed in the United States. 123 Judge Cott also
reasoned that:
Although Italy may have an interest in the communications, none
of the documents reflect that advice was requested or rendered re-
garding Italian law. At best, Italy's interest in the Volpi communi-
cations may be considered equal to that of the United States. Such
interest does not trump that of the United States in applying its laws
to communications concerning the conduct of an action pending in a
United States court .... 124
B. Attorney-Client Privilege Extends to the Post-October 2008
Communications of Vanni Volpi Because he Acted as an Agent of
Delia Rosa During that Time Period
In order to invoke the attorney-client privilege, a party must show:
"(1) a communication between client and counsel that (2) was in-
tended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) was made for
the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice."1 25 The attorney-
client privilege may be extended to an agent of the attorney when the
agent's sole role is to assist the attorney in representing the client. 126
Gucci I held that, for the purpose of the post-October 2008 commu-
nications, Volpi was acting as an agent of Delia Rosa and, therefore,
those communications are protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege. 127 Judge Cott pointed out that Volpi acted at Delia Rosa's direc-
tion and continuously communicated with Delia Rosa at each step of
120. Id.
121. Id. at 66.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 67.
125. Id. at 70 (quoting In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007)).
126. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
127. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 71.
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the investigation.128 Judge Cott relied heavily on the fact that Volpi
was not acting in an autonomous role post-October 2008 but, rather,
was "deputized" in his information-gathering role.129
Guess argued that the post-October 2008 communications were not
privileged because Volpi did not possess "'highly specialized knowl-
edge' that assists the attorney in representing the client" and that
Volpi was not performing ministerial tasks, which are two standards in
the Kovel test for applying attorney-client privilege to an agent's
work.130 Judge Cott responded that Guess had construed an overly
rigid form of the Kovel test.131 Rather, Gucci I stated that
"'[c]ommunications among non-attorneys in a corporation may be
privileged if made at the direction of counsel, to gather information to
aid counsel in providing legal services."1 32
Responding to Guess's argument that Volpi's post-October 2008
communications should not be privileged because he was not a li-
censed professional, Judge Cott found that the fact that Volpi was not
a licensed attorney was not "outcome determinative."13 3 Rather,
"[t]he standard is whether the third-party agent is supervised directly
by an attorney and whether the communications were intended to re-
main confidential."1 34 The court reasoned that Volpi's role on the le-
gal team reflected Gucci's expectation that Volpi's communications
would remain confidential.' 3 5
Despite these assertions, Gucci I then took a 180-degree turn in its
reasoning. Previously in its opinion, the court ignored Guess's argu-
ment that Volpi did not perform strictly ministerial tasks as required
under the Kovel test, and the court pointed to the overarching super-
vision by Delia Rosa.136 However, Gucci I went on to note that
"[a]lthough [Volpi's] responsibilities clearly extended beyond ministe-
rial tasks, it is not necessary that Delia Rosa . . . 'observed and ap-
proved every minute aspect of [Volpi's] work.' ""7 The court also
reversed its previous assertions on the role of autonomous work:
"[T]he privilege extends to an agent proceeding autonomously."13 8
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 72.
131. Id.






137. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 72 (quoting In re Rivastigmine, 237 F.R.D. at 81).
138. Id.
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Although the actual holding is unclear because of the turnabout in
the court's reasoning, its opinion is consistent with the overall ratio-
nale behind the attorney-client privilege. As previously stated, the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to make clients feel com-
fortable in sharing all legally relevant information with their attorney
so that the attorney is capable of providing sound legal advice and aid
when addressing legal issues. 39 In this situation, the attorney-client
privilege meets its purpose because, first, the client-in this case,
Gucci-shared its private but legally relevant information in a setting
it believed was confidential. This confidential setting enabled Gucci,
as the client, to feel comfortable in sharing all relevant information
without the fear that such information may be leaked into the wrong
hands. Second, the information assisted the attorneys in the further-
ance of their legal advice and aid to Gucci: counsel was consequently
capable of learning all relevant information it needed in order to file
suit against Guess. The fact that this information was passed through
a third party-Volpi-should not matter. An attorney may need to
rely on numerous assistants when preparing for litigation and when
those assistants are performing roles, such as information gathering,
which were traditionally performed by the attorney, the agent's work
should also be confidential. Because the information remained confi-
dential and aided the attorneys in providing sound legal advice, the
opinion in Gucci I helped to uphold the ultimate purpose of the attor-
ney-client privilege.
C. The Post-October 2008 Communications of Vanni Volpi and
Jonathan Moss are Eligible for Protection From Disclosure Under
the Work Product Doctrine Because the Documents Reflect that
Gucci and GG Performed Work "Because of" the Prospect of
Litigation Between November 2008 and April 2009
The work product doctrine protects the work of attorneys and ap-
plies to: "(1) a document or tangible thing, (2) that was prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and (3) was prepared by or for a party, or by
or for his representative."1 40 The work product doctrine also applies
to agents of an attorney who are "enlisted by legal counsel to perform
investigative or analytical tasks to aid counsel in preparation for litiga-
tion."141 However, the protections afforded under the work product
139. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
140. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 73-74 (quoting In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6112, at *22-24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005)).
141. Id. at 74 (quoting Costabile v. Westchester, N.Y., 254 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008));
see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975).
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doctrine can be overcome by the other party if the party seeking dis-
covery can show it has a "substantial need for the materials," and
"cannot obtain the substantial equivalent 'without undue
hardship.' "142
Gucci I held that the post-October 2008 communications of both
Volpi and Moss were protected by the work product doctrine because
they were prepared by an agent of GG or Gucci in anticipation of
litigation.143 Judge Cott reasoned that the documents were created
after Gucci decided to find information supporting its claims against
Guess.144 "The [c]ourt f[ound] no evidence that these documents
were prepared in the ordinary course of business, or that they would
have been created for any reason other than 'because of' the prospect
of litigation."14 5 The holding on this point is correct and supports the
underlying rationale behind the work product doctrine.
Gucci I further held that Guess failed to show both "substantial
need" for the communications and an "undue hardship" in its case
without production of the communications.14 6 The court pointed to
other evidence that was available to Guess other than the communica-
tions, which could effectively show the same or similar information as
that contained in the communications. 1 4 7
D. Neither the Attorney-Client Privilege nor the Work Product
Doctrine Extends to the Pre-October 2008 Communications of Vanni
Volpi; Therefore, Those Documents Must be Produced
Gucci I held that the pre-October 2008 communications by Volpi
were not protected by the attorney-client privilege.148 Judge Cott
pointed to evidence that Volpi was not acting under Delia Rosa's di-
rection at that time and that Volpi was not personally involved with
information gathering.149 Although the evidence is scant here, the
court gave some credence to Guess's argument that Volpi was acting
as a de facto attorney during the pre-October 2008 period.150
The application of the attorney-client privilege to the pre-October
2008 communications here differs drastically from its application of
the privilege to the post-October 2008 communications. For the pre-
142. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 74 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)).
143. Id. at 75.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting United States v. AdIman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
146. Id. at 80-81.
147. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 80.
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October 2008 communications, Judge Cott gave weight to the fact that
Volpi's work was not directly overseen, whereas he quickly dismissed
that factor for the post-October 2008 communications. 151 The only
difference that Judge Cott points to between the two sets of communi-
cations is the fact that Delia Rosa started working for GG in Septem-
ber 2007 and that GG did not specify to whom Volpi had previously
been reporting. 152 However, the court does not account for any dif-
ference in Volpi's duties during the time from September 2007 to Oc-
tober 2008 (when Delia Rosa was present at GG) and the
communications that occurred post-October 2008 (which the court
held protected from discovery).
The inconsistency in the Gucci I opinion-holding the attorney-cli-
ent privilege applicable to the post-October 2008 communications but
not the pre-October 2008 communications-does not support the
overall rationale behind the attorney-client privilege. Although Volpi
may not have been acting directly under Delia Rosa's direction at the
time, she remained his supervisor and he reported to her daily in that
context. Therefore, essentially the same types of communications
took place in the pre-October 2008 communications as in the post-
October 2008 communications. Gucci personnel shared private, le-
gally-relevant information with Volpi with the understanding that the
information would help the legal aid of the corporation. Volpi then
turned around and gave daily reports to Delia Rosa. This situation
ultimately meets the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege because there was an atmosphere of confidence between the cli-
ent and the legal personnel that opened the gateway of
communication to counsel to be used in the aid of sound legal advice.
Because the court did not hold the pre-October 2008 documents privi-
leged, the court's decision failed to uphold the ultimate purpose of the
attorney-client privilege.
Gucci I also held that the pre-October 2008 communications were
not protected by the work product doctrine. 153 The court reasoned
that, at this point in time, Volpi's work was not being produced for the
"prospect of litigation." 15 4 Furthermore, the court found that a "pos-
sibility" of litigation is not enough to elicit the work product protec-
tions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 55
151. Id. at 72.
152. Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 73.




This holding places an arbitrary time frame on when a corporation
may move from preparing for the possibility of litigation, when the
work product doctrine does not apply, to when a corporation is pre-
paring documents because of the prospect of litigation, when the work
product doctrine does apply. A bright-line rule is needed in order to
put corporations on notice as to when their attorneys' work will be
protected by the work product doctrine. Without a bright-line rule, in
situations such as an in-house counsel context in which there is con-
stant communication between the attorney and client, an attorney
cannot always be confident that his work is protected from discovery.
E. All Communications Between Gucci and Jonathan Moss that
Were Made for the Purpose of Giving Legal Advice are Entitled to
Protection Pursuant to the Attorney-Client Privilege
In the seminal case on attorney-client privilege, United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts established that, in order to invoke the at-
torney-client privilege, the communication must have been made to a
"member of the bar of a court." 156 Judge Scheindlin in Gucci II held
that, even though Moss' bar status was inactive, he still met this re-
quirement.157 The court did not provide any reasoning for holding
that an inactive member could still meet this requirement; rather, the
court pointed to the rationale behind the attorney-client privilege:
"The purpose of the privilege is to protect the client's communication,
and to encourage full and frank disclosure when seeking legal advice,
which is why the client holds the privilege and only the client can as-
sert or waive it."158 The court reasoned that because Moss occupied a
legal position in the company and that Gucci was his sole client, the
communications between Moss and Gucci were "clearly intended to
be protected." 59
Although a challenged communication may not be made to an at-
torney, it may still be protected under the attorney-client privilege if a
party can show that it "reasonably believed that the person to whom
the communications were made was in fact an attorney." 160 Gucci and
Guess disputed two aspects of this exception: (1) "whether a corpora-
tion [could] claim a reasonable belief" and (2) whether the party in-
156. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
157. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011).
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id. at *7.
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voking the reasonable belief exception had to first take reasonable
precautions in determining whether the person to whom the commu-
nications were made was in fact an attorney.161
On the former issue, Gucci II held that a corporation could make a
claim under the reasonable belief exception just like an individual per-
son.162 On the latter issue, the court held that a corporation does not
have any duty to take reasonable precautions and conduct due dili-
gence to determine whether a person is an attorney before communi-
cations are made.163 However, the court qualified its holding in a
footnote, stating that:
A corporation's failure to demonstrate a "respectable degree of
caution" in hiring an individual to serve as in-house counsel may in
some cases shed light on the reasonableness of its belief that the
individual was its attorney, but that does not translate into a re-
quirement that a corporation conduct due diligence in hiring and/or
promoting an attorney who represents that he is a member of a
bar.164
Gucci II then held that all of Moss' communications were protected
under the attorney-client privilege as Gucci had a reasonable belief
that Moss was an attorney.165 This reasonable belief arose because
Moss had competently performed all the normal functions of an attor-
ney at Gucci over an extended period of time, leading people to be-
lieve that he was a qualified and licensed attorney. 66
Judge Scheindlin's ruling removes almost any responsibility for a
corporation to make sure that the corporation hires a competent and
licensed attorney. Gucci argued that requiring corporations to check
continually on their in-house counsel's bar membership status before
confiding in them was inefficient and "simply does not make
sense. "167 However, the situation here was not one in which the in-
house counsel's license went inactive overnight and the corporation
faced harm by failing to "continually" check the status of the attor-
ney's bar membership before making each confidential communica-
tion. Rather, in this case, Gucci never checked into the status of their
in-house counsel, even before Gucci hired Moss.
Corporations should be responsible for hiring competent profes-
sionals and conducting appropriate background checks for relevant
161. Id. at *8.
162. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *19.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *22 n.35.
165. Id. at *22.
166. Id. at *23.
167. Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, at *24.
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professional licenses. Often, corporations have their own incentives
to do a thorough background search into the qualifications of the indi-
viduals they are hiring. This is especially true when hiring in-house
legal counsel-there are obvious detriments to a corporation that
hires an incompetent or unlicensed attorney to represent its interests.
However, as the facts of this case point out, there are times when a
corporation may hire a person who appears to be a competent attor-
ney in all respects due to his former professional work and r6sum6,
but ends up being unlicensed. For situations such as these, there
needs to be some form of regulation or disincentives for a corporation
to hire such people. While legislation may be one option, the courts
should also step in. Here, the court not only failed to provide a disin-
centive, but also rewarded Gucci's negligent hiring practices by al-
lowing Gucci to protect its communications from discovery under the
attorney-client privilege.
V. BEYOND THE Gucci LITIGATION
Although the rulings in the litigation between Gucci and Guess may
be easily tossed aside as lower court opinions in a single case, it is
important to note that the more recently decided case has already
been cited favorably by courts in the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th Circuits and
currently no court has opposed the ruling.168 Therefore, one must
consider the impact of the decision on the legal doctrines of attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine and its applicability to in-
house counsel.
First, the holding in Gucci I, later upheld in Gucci II, that Volpi's
communications touched base with the United States and, therefore,
were governed by American privilege laws, is an important aspect to
consider in the modern world of multinational corporations. The
modern corporation typically has numerous subsidiaries and affiliates
around the world and each office may have a different corporate
counsel. The assurance that communications among the different le-
gal offices around the world will be afforded the heightened protec-
tions that American law gives to attorney-client communications
allows a corporation to communicate more freely within its own cor-
porate network. It also alleviates any time-consuming consideration
of different countries' laws when a corporation is attempting to con-
168. See Buxbaum v. St. Vincent's Health Servs., No. 3:12CV117, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2246,
at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 2013); Astrazeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08-1512, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42405, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011); Roe v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colo., 281 F.R.D. 632,
639 (D. Colo. 2012).
2014] 407
408 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:387
vey important legal communications within its own corporate
network. 169
Second, the ruling in Gucci I, later upheld in Gucci II, that Volpi's
post-October 2008 communications are protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege impacts the role of non-attorney legal personnel within a
corporate legal department. Many corporate legal departments today
rely not only on attorneys, but also on legal secretaries, law clerks, and
other legal assistants. After the opinion in Gucci, corporations can
rest more easily that their reliance on such personnel will not ad-
versely affect them if litigation arises and another party requests legal
personnel's communications.
Third, the holding in Gucci I, later upheld in Gucci II, that Volpi's
and Moss' post-October 2008 communications are protected under
the work product doctrine is a standard application of the work prod-
uct doctrine. However, considering this holding in conjunction with
part of the fourth ruling by the court-that Volpi's pre-October 2008
communications are not protected by the work product doctrine-
does raise some issues for corporations in terms of the ambiguous
time frame between when documents are prepared "because of the
prospect" of litigation and when documents are prepared contemplat-
ing possible litigation. This issue is especially important for in-house
counsel attorneys who advise the corporation for both regular busi-
ness transactions, which are not protected, and for litigation issues,
which are protected. Following these holdings in Gucci, corporations
may best be advised to acknowledge affirmatively that documents are
being made "because of the prospect" of litigation in some way.170
However, an appropriate way of taking these precautions is not read-
ily apparent from the court's holding.
The fourth ruling in Gucci I, later upheld in Gucci II, held that
Volpi's pre-October 2008 communications were not protected by the
attorney-client privilege. This ruling dampers the impact of the sec-
ond ruling and should alert corporations that there are restrictions on
the applicability of privilege to their non-attorney personnel's commu-
nications. Specifically, the non-attorney personnel may need to be
under somewhat significant legal oversight by a licensed attorney in
order for their communications to be privileged. Corporations should
be aware of this when structuring their legal departments.
The fifth holding, which comes from Gucci II, that all of Moss' com-
munications were protected under the attorney-client privilege is per-
169. See Michael Campion Miller & Richard Rondoux, Foreign In-House Counsel Communi-
cations, 247 N.Y. L.J. 45 (2012).
170. See Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, supra note 78.
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haps the largest impact Gucci had on the doctrine. The current legal
precedent from Gucci supports allowing corporations to conduct no
due diligence when hiring their counsel. Rather, corporations can rely
completely on the confidence of their communications with someone
who does not have an active bar membership, an aspect that was tradi-
tionally required in applying the attorney-client privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
While, at its core, the Gucci litigation concerned a trademark in-
fringement suit, it also presented several interesting procedural issues
under which the legal doctrines concerning attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine were stretched within the corporate coun-
sel realm. Gucci I, holding that the communications by the interna-
tional affiliate touched base and, therefore, were governed by
American law furthered the protections given under the doctrines.
Furthermore, the holding from Gucci I that Volpi's post-October 2008
communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege
served the underlying purpose of that doctrine. On the other hand,
the holding from Gucci I that Volpi's pre-October 2008 communica-
tions were not protected by the attorney-client privilege seemed arbi-
trary and went against the grain of the doctrine. The court's
application of the work product doctrine also appeared arbitrary in its
application of the privilege to some documents and not others, raising
issues on the time frame of when documents will be considered made
"because of the prospect" of litigation. Finally, while the Gucci II
holding that all of Moss' communications were protected under the
attorney-client privilege expanded that doctrine's application in the
in-house counsel setting, the application may be too broad and should
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